The following is an incomplete pointer to some of the literature on or relevant to fragmentation.

Classical sources for the fragmentation view

Cherniak, C. (1981). “Minimal Rationality”, Mind 90, 161-83.

Cherniak, C. (1983). “Rationality and the Structure of Human Memory”, Synthese 57(2), 163-86.

Davidson, D. (1982). “Paradoxes of Irrationality”, In R. Wolheim and J. Hopkins (eds.), Philosophical Essays on Freud, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in his Problems of Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 169-187.

Davidson, D. (1986). “Deception and Division”. In J. Elster (ed.), The Multiple Self, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in his Problems of Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 199-212.

Lewis, D. (1982). “Logic for Equivocators.” Noûs 16(3), 431-41.

Stalnaker, R. (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Stalnaker, R. (1991). “The Problem of Logical Omniscience, I.” Synthese 89(3), 425-40. Reprinted in his Context and Content (1999), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 241-54.

Stalnaker, R. (1999). “The Problem of Logical Omniscience, II.” In his Context and Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 255-73.

Contemporary endorsements of fragmentation

Egan, A. (2008). “Seeing and Believing. Perception, Belief-Formation and the Divided Mind.” Philosophical Studies 140(1), 47-63.

Egan, A. (2009). “Imagination, Delusion, and Self-Deception.” In Bayne, T. and Fernandez, J. (eds.), Delusion and Self Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation. Hove: Psychology Press.

Egan, A. and Davies, M. (2013). “Delusion: Cognitive Approaches – Bayesian Inference and Compartmentalisation.” In Fulford, K.W.M., Davies, M., Gipps, R.G.T., Graham, G., Sadler, J., Stanghellini, G. and Thornton, T. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Elga, A. and Rayo, A. (2015). “Fragmentation and Information Access.” Unpublished Ms.

Elga, A. and Rayo, A. (2015). “Fragmentation and Logical Omniscience.” Unpublished Ms.

Greco, D. (2014). “Iteration and Fragmentation.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1).

Rayo, A. (2013). The Construction of Logical Space. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Yalcin, S. (2008). Modality and Inquiry. PhD Dissertation, MIT

Against Closure and Consistency

Christensen, D. (2004). Putting Logic in Its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Easwaran, K. and Fitelson, B. (forthcoming). “Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence.” In Gendler , T. Szabó and Hawthorne, J. (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harman, G. (1986). Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Kolodny, N. (2007). “How does coherence matter?” In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1), 229-263.

Kolodny, N. (2008). “Why Be Disposed to Be Coherent?” Ethics 118(3), 437-63.

On the Problem of Logical Omniscience

Brown, B. and Priest, G. (2004). “Chunk and Permeate, a Paraconsistent Inference Strategy. Part I: The Infinitesimal Calculus.” Journal of Philosophial Logic 33(4), 379-88.

Elga, A. and Rayo, A. (2015). “Fragmentation and Logical Omniscience.” Unpublished Ms.

Garber, D. (1983). “Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience in Bayesian Confirmation Theory.” In Earman, J. (ed.),Testing Scientific Theories. Midwest Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. X. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 99-131.

Hintikka, J. (1962). Knowledge and Belief. An Introduction to the Logic of Two Notions. Ithaka, NY: Cornell University Press

Parikh, R. (1995). “Logical Omniscience.” In Logic and Computational Complexity. International Workshop LCC ’94. Selected Papers. Springer-Verlag, pp. 22-29.

Parikh, R. (2008). “Sentences, Belief, and Logical Omniscience, Or What Does Deduction Tell Us? The Review of Symbolic Logic 1(4), 459-76.

Stalnaker, R. (1991). “The Problem of Logical Omniscience, I.” Synthese 89(3), 425-40. Reprinted in his Context and Content (1999), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 241-54.

Stalnaker, R. (1999). “The Problem of Logical Omniscience, II.” In his Context and Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 255-73.

On Cognitive Dissonance

Borgoni, C. (2014). “Dissonance and Irrationality: a criticism of the in-between account of dissonance cases”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/papq.12039.

Borgoni, C. (2014). “Dissonance and Doxastic Resistance”, Erkenntnis, doi 10.1007/s10670-014-9691-0.

Borgoni, C. (2015). “Dissonance and Moorean Propositions”, Dialectica, doi 10.1111/1746-8361.12095.

Gendler, T. S. (2008). “Alief and Belief.” Journal of Philosophy 105, 634-63.

Gendler, T. S. (2008). “Alief in Action (and Reaction).” Mind & Language 23(5), 552-85.

Nagel, J. (2012). “Gendler on Alief” (Book Symposium), Analysis 72 (4), 774-788.

Nagel, J. (2014). “Intuition, Reflection, and the Command of Knowledge”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 88, 217-39.

Schwitzgebel, E. (2001). “In-Between Believing.” Philosophical Quarterly 51, 76-82.

Schwitzgebel, Eric. (2002). “A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Beliefs”, Noûs 36, 249-75

Schwitzgebel, E. (2010).Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs, or The Gulf. Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91(4), 531-53.