Graz, 25-26 May 2017

Program

May 25, 2017

11:00-12:10 Joseph Bendana (CUNY) “Implicit Biases Are Probably Beliefs”

13:30-14:40 Martina Fürst (Graz) “Implicit bias and phenomenal concepts”

15:00-16:10 Anna Welpinghus (Dortmund) “The role of imagination for implicit bias”

16:30-17:40 (Keynote) Eric Schwitzgebel (UC Riverside) “The Pragmatic Metaphysics of Belief”

May 26, 2017

10:00-11:10 (Keynote) Josefa Toribio (ICREA-UB) “Fragmented beliefs or associations: the case of implicit attitudes”

11:30-12:40 Cristina Borgoni (Graz) and Yannig Luthra (UCLA) “Fragmentation and Implicit biased Attitudes”

14:00-15:10 Annemarie Kalis (Utrecht) “Implicit bias: what’s the problem?”

15:30-16:40 Round Table.

Venue: Heirinchstrasse 26, 5th Floor, room 09.51. Graz, Austria. The venue is accessible by elevator. Everyone is welcome.

Organizers: Cristina Borgoni, Marian David, Dirk Kindermann, Andrea Onofri

Contact: fragmentationprojectgraz@gmail.com.

3rd Fragmentation Workshop: Fragmentation and the Content of Belief

Graz, 17-18 March 2017

The 3^rd Fragmentation Workshop: Fragmentation and the Content of Belief is organised by the research project The Fragmented Mind and will take place at the University of Graz, Austria, on March 17-18, 2017.

Keynote speakers:

• Prof. Imogen Dickie (University of Toronto)
• Prof. François Recanati (Institut Jean Nicod – Paris)
• Prof. Robert Stalnaker (MIT)
• Prof. Seth Yalcin (UC Berkeley)

Fragmentation, or compartmentalisation, is roughly the view that a single agent has various separate systems of belief, which need not make for a consistent and deductively closed overall system. This notion of fragmentation has been employed in the work of Cherniak, Lewis, and Stalnaker, and has more recently been developed by philosophers such as Egan, Greco, Rayo, Yalcin and others.

The goal of this workshop is to examine the potential role of fragmentation in accounting for the content of belief and other propositional attitudes. The nature of belief content remains one of the most fascinating and debated issues in contemporary philosophy of mind. The fragmentation hypothesis promises to provide a novel perspective on this challenging issue.

Non-exhaustive list of topics:

• Can fragmentation solve notorious problems arising for possible-worlds accounts of mental content, such as the “problem of deduction”?
• What role can fragmentation play in a theory of mathematical and logical knowledge?
• Can fragmentation provide a novel solution to Frege’s Puzzle, i.e. the puzzle of explaining the possibility of confusion and ignorance about the identity of certain objects (e.g. Hesperus and Phosphorus)?
• Can fragmentation help illuminate the nature of “modes of presentation”?
• Should structured theories of mental content (e.g. Fregean and Russellian views) appeal to fragmentation?
• What is the connection between mental and linguistic content from the perspective of fragmentation accounts?

Organizers: Andrea Onofri, Cristina Borgoni, Marian David, Dirk Kindermann

Contact: Andrea Onofri, andonofri@gmail.com

Institute of Philosophy, University of Graz, Austria

CFA

4^th Fragmentation Workshop: Dissonance and Implicit Bias

Graz, 25-26 May 2017 

The 4th Fragmentation Workshop: Dissonance and Implicit Bias is organized by the research project The Fragmented Mind and will take place at the University of Graz, Austria, on May 25-26, 2017. We welcome submissions of anonymized abstracts of 500–1000 words for 45 minutes presentations on any of the workshop topics — see below — made by December 15, 2016 at fragmentationprojectgraz@gmail.com.

Keynote speakers:

• Eric Schwitzgebel (UC Riverside)
• Jules Holroyd (Sheffield)

It is highly disputed what the psychological underpinnings of assertion-behavior dissonance and implicit bias are. Under some interpretations, these are special cases of belief fragmentation, i.e., the view that a single agent has various separate systems of belief, which need not make for a consistent and deductively closed overall system. Under other interpretations, dissonance does not represent a state of fragmentation nor does implicit bias involve the presence of conflicting beliefs.

The objective of this workshop is to explore the adequacy and limitations of the notion of fragmentation (as advanced, for example, by Davidson, Lewis, Stalnaker, and Rayo), when applied to cases of dissonance and implicit bias.

(Non-exhaustive) list of topics:

• What are the psychological underpinnings of assertion-behavior dissonance?
• What are the psychological underpinnings of implicit bias?
• Are dissonance and implicit bias overlapping phenomena?
• Does fragmentation help explaining cases of assertion-behavior dissonance?
• Does fragmentation help explaining implicit bias?

Submission format:

Submissions of anonymous abstracts of 500-1000 words (excluding bibliography), prepared for anonymous peer-review, should be sent to fragmentationproject@gmail.com by December 15, 2016. Abstracts should be submitted in pdf format, in English.

Authors will be notified of decisions by January 31, 2017. Please indicate the title of your paper in your email.

Some support for travel and accommodation might be available.

Organizers:  Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann, Andrea Onofri

Contact:  fragmentationprojectgraz@gmail.com

1st Fragmentation Workshop: Foundations

October 16, 2015