NEWS

UPCOMING EVENTS

 Talks by Brian Weatherson and Adam Elga in Graz 

The following two talks are organised by the research project The Fragmented Mind and will take place at the University of Graz, Austria:

1) Prof. Brian Weatherson (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor): “Fragmentation, Practical Reason and Blame”

Date: 13.12.2017, 12:00-13:30

Location: Heinrichstraße 26, fifth floor, room number: SR 09.53, Graz, Austria

2) Prof. Adam Elga (Princeton University): “Fragmentation, Mathematical Ignorance, and the Metalinguistic Reply” (videoconference)

Date: 16.01.2018, 16:00-18:00

Location: Universitätsstraße 15, Bauteil G, first floor, room number: 015G010080 (videoconference room), Graz, Austria

Registration: Attendance is free and everyone is welcome. Places are limited and will be allocated on a first-come, first-served basis. If you are planning to attend, please send an email to andonofri(at)gmail.com

Contact: Dr. Andrea Onofri, andonofri(at)gmail.com . Please do not hesitate to get in touch if you have any questions.

Website: http://fragmentationproject.uni-graz.at

The research project The Fragmented Mind is funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF – project number: P27587-G15). We gratefully acknowledge the FWF’s support.

 

4th Fragmentation Workshop

Graz, 25-26 May 2017

Program

May 25, 2017

11:00-12:10 Joseph Bendana (CUNY) “Implicit Biases Are Probably Beliefs”

13:30-14:40 Martina Fürst (Graz) “Implicit bias and phenomenal concepts”

15:00-16:10 Anna Welpinghus (Dortmund) “The role of imagination for implicit bias”

16:30-17:40 (Keynote) Eric Schwitzgebel (UC Riverside) “The Pragmatic Metaphysics of Belief”

May 26, 2017

10:00-11:10 (Keynote) Josefa Toribio (ICREA-UB) “Fragmented beliefs or associations: the case of implicit attitudes”

11:30-12:40 Cristina Borgoni (Graz) and Yannig Luthra (UCLA) “Fragmentation and Implicit biased Attitudes”

14:00-15:10 Annemarie Kalis (Utrecht) “Implicit bias: what’s the problem?”

15:30-16:40 Round Table.

Venue: Heirinchstrasse 26, 5th Floor, room 09.51. Graz, Austria. The venue is accessible by elevator. Everyone is welcome.

Organizers: Cristina Borgoni, Marian David, Dirk Kindermann, Andrea Onofri

Contact: fragmentationprojectgraz@gmail.com.

3rd Fragmentation Workshop

3rd Fragmentation Workshop: Fragmentation and the Content of Belief

Graz, 17-18 March 2017

 

The 3rd Fragmentation Workshop: Fragmentation and the Content of Belief is organised by the research project The Fragmented Mind and will take place at the University of Graz, Austria, on March 17-18, 2017.

Keynote speakers:

  • Imogen Dickie (University of Toronto)
  • François Recanati (Institut Jean Nicod – Paris)
  • Robert Stalnaker (MIT)
  • Seth Yalcin (UC Berkeley)

 

Schedule:

Friday 17 March:

  • 11.45am – 1.15pm: Robert Stalnaker: “Fragmentation and Singular Propositions”
  • Lunch
  • 3pm – 4.30pm: Seth Yalcin: “Subject Matter in Mind”
  • 4.45pm – 6.15pm: Andrea Onofri: “Defending the Fragmentation Approach to Deduction”

Saturday 18 March:

  • 10am – 11.30am: Imogen Dickie: “Atoms, Fragments, and Two Kinds of Singular Thought”
  • 11.45am – 1.15pm: François Recanati: “Do Mental Files Obey Strawson’s Constraint (One Object, One File)?”

 

Registration: attendance is free and everyone is welcome. If you are planning to attend please send an email to: andonofri@gmail.com

Venue: room 09.51, fifth floor, Heinrichstraße 26, 8010 Graz. The venue is accessible by elevator. We are committed to hosting an accessible event.

Organizers: Andrea Onofri, Cristina Borgoni, Marian David, Dirk Kindermann

Contact: Andrea Onofri, andonofri@gmail.com . Please do not hesitate to get in touch if you have any questions.

Website: http://fragmentationproject.uni-graz.at/

Topic:

Fragmentation, or compartmentalisation, is roughly the view that a single agent has various separate systems of belief, which need not make for a consistent and deductively closed overall system. This notion of fragmentation has been employed in the work of Cherniak, Lewis, and Stalnaker, and has more recently been developed by philosophers such as Egan, Greco, Rayo, Yalcin and others.

The goal of this workshop is to examine the potential role of fragmentation in accounting for the content of belief and other propositional attitudes. The nature of belief content remains one of the most fascinating and debated issues in contemporary philosophy of mind. The fragmentation hypothesis promises to provide a novel perspective on this challenging issue.

Non-exhaustive list of topics:

  • Can fragmentation solve notorious problems arising for possible-worlds accounts of mental content, such as the “problem of deduction”?
  • What role can fragmentation play in a theory of mathematical and logical knowledge?
  • Can fragmentation provide a novel solution to Frege’s Puzzle, i.e. the puzzle of explaining the possibility of confusion and ignorance about the identity of certain objects (e.g. Hesperus and Phosphorus)?
  • Can fragmentation help illuminate the nature of “modes of presentation”?
  • Should structured theories of mental content (e.g. Fregean and Russellian views) appeal to fragmentation?
  • What is the connection between mental and linguistic content from the perspective of fragmentation accounts?

CFA – 4TH Fragmentation Workshop

CFA

4th Fragmentation Workshop: Dissonance and Implicit Bias

Graz, 25-26 May 2017 

The 4th Fragmentation Workshop: Dissonance and Implicit Bias is organized by the research project The Fragmented Mind and will take place at the University of Graz, Austria, on May 25-26, 2017. We welcome submissions of anonymized abstracts of 500–1000 words for 45 minutes presentations on any of the workshop topics — see below — made by December 15, 2016 at fragmentationprojectgraz@gmail.com.

Keynote speakers:

  • Eric Schwitzgebel (UC Riverside)
  • Jules Holroyd (Sheffield)

It is highly disputed what the psychological underpinnings of assertion-behavior dissonance and implicit bias are. Under some interpretations, these are special cases of belief fragmentation, i.e., the view that a single agent has various separate systems of belief, which need not make for a consistent and deductively closed overall system. Under other interpretations, dissonance does not represent a state of fragmentation nor does implicit bias involve the presence of conflicting beliefs.

The objective of this workshop is to explore the adequacy and limitations of the notion of fragmentation (as advanced, for example, by Davidson, Lewis, Stalnaker, and Rayo), when applied to cases of dissonance and implicit bias.

(Non-exhaustive) list of topics:

  • What are the psychological underpinnings of assertion-behavior dissonance?
  • What are the psychological underpinnings of implicit bias?
  • Are dissonance and implicit bias overlapping phenomena?
  • Does fragmentation help explaining cases of assertion-behavior dissonance?
  • Does fragmentation help explaining implicit bias?

Submission format:

Submissions of anonymous abstracts of 500-1000 words (excluding bibliography), prepared for anonymous peer-review, should be sent to fragmentationproject@gmail.com by December 15, 2016. Abstracts should be submitted in pdf format, in English.

Authors will be notified of decisions by January 31, 2017. Please indicate the title of your paper in your email.

Some support for travel and accommodation might be available.

Organizers:  Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann, Andrea Onofri

Contact:  fragmentationprojectgraz@gmail.com

EVENTS IN 2016

2nd Fragmentation Workshop: Developments in Philosophy and Psychology

Graz, 6-7 May 2016

Friday 6 May:

10:00–11:30am Agustin Rayo: “Fragmentation and Logical Omniscience” (with Adam Elga)

11:45am–1:15pm Sam Carter “Cognitive Maps And Fragmentation”

LUNCH

2:45–4:15pm Richard Dub “Emotions and Irruptive Cognitions“

4:45–6:15 Joseph Bendana “Dispositionalism and Belief Fragmentation“ (with Jake Quilty-Dunn)

8:00pm Dinner at Lendplatzl

Saturday, 7 May:

9:30–11:00am Martin Lipman “Split-Brains and Fragmented Minds”

11:15am–12:45pm Cristina Borgoni: “Norms of Fragmentation“

LUNCH

2:00–3:30pm Dan Greco “Fragmentation in Epistemology”

4:00–5:30pm Lars Dänzer “Task-Indexing, Fragmentation and Tacit Knowledge“

CFA – 2nd Fragmentation Workshop

CFA
2nd Fragmentation Workshop: Developments in Philosophy and Psychology
Graz, 6-7 May 2016 
The 2nd Fragmentation Workshop: Developments in Philosophy and Psychology is organised by the research project The Fragmented Mind and will take place at the University of Graz, Austria, on May 6-7, 2016. We welcome submissions of anonymized abstracts of 500–1000 words for 45 minutes presentations on any aspect of the workshop topic — see below — made by 28 February 2016 at fragmentationprojectgraz@gmail.com.
Keynote speakers:
  • Agustín Rayo (MIT)
  • Dan Greco (Yale)
Fragmentation, or compartmentalisation, is roughly the view that a single agent has various separate systems of belief, which need not make for a consistent and deductively closed overall system. This notion of fragmentation has been developed and employed in the work of Cherniak, Lewis, and Stalnaker, and has more recently been advertised by philosophers such as Egan, Elga, Greco, Rayo, among others. Despite great advances, many fundamental questions regarding the status of the fragmentation hypothesis, its explanatory benefits, and the details of a fleshed-out theory of fragmentation remain open. The objective of this workshop is to investigate ways of developing the fragmentation hypothesis and to evaluate its explanatory merits and limits.
(Non-exhaustive) list of topics:
  • What is a theory of fragmentation?
  • What are the main motivations for fragmentation? What are its main problems?
  • What speaks in favour of realism about fragmentation? What reasons are there for anti-realism, or eliminativism, about fragmentation?
  • Which views of belief are compatible with fragmentation?
  • Is the reference to other attitude types (e.g. Tamar Gendler’s alief) or to more subtle distinctions (e.g. Brie Gertler’s beliefs vs. judgments) explanatorily equivalent to fragmentation?
  • How does Davidson’s notion of “mental division” relate to fragmentation?
  • What is the relation between fragmentation and memory?
  • What is the relationship between fragmentation and dual-process theory?
  • What is the relationship between fragmentation and the modularity of mind?
  • Do empirical studies on memory, or other cognitive aspects, support the fragmentation hypothesis?
  • Can a theory of fragmentation help us solve some of philosophy’s perennial problems and puzzles?
Submission format:
Submissions of anonymous abstracts of 500-1000 words (exclusive bibliography),prepared for anonymous peer-review, in pdf format should be sent to fragmentationproject@gmail.com by 28 February 2016. Authors will be notified of decisions by 15 March 2016. Please indicate in your email the title of your paper.
Some support for travel and accommodation might be available.
Submission deadline:  28 February 2016
Organisers:  Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann
Institute of Philosophy

EVENTS IN 2015

 

1st Fragmentation Workshop: Foundations

October 16, 2015

Program:

10:00-11:30 Christopher Gauker “Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication”
12:00-13:30 Cristina Borgoni “Cognitive Dissonance and Belief Fragmentation”
13:30-15:00 Lunch
15:00-16:30 Marian David “Fragmented Minds: Some Basic Issues”
17:00–18:30 Dirk Kindermann “Frege’s Puzzle and Fragmentation”

Venue: Heirinchstrasse 26, 5th Floor, room 09.51. Graz, Austria. The venue is accessible by elevator.

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